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PROTECTION EXTEND UNDER DODD–FRANK? 
THOMAS J. MCCORMAC, IV† 
Khaled Asadi and Daniel Berman worked for companies that were subject to various 
U.S. securities laws. During the course of their employment, both became aware of 
potential violations of law and dutifully reported this information to their superiors. Soon 
thereafter, both men lost their jobs; they believe this was in retaliation for their 
whistleblowing activity. Both brought suit under Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protection 
provisions, which define a whistleblower as “any individual who provides . . . information 
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.” Because Mr. Asadi and 
Mr. Berman only reported violations to their supervisors internally and not to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), their protection under Dodd–Frank was 
uncertain. The Fifth Circuit held that Dodd–Frank did not protect Mr. Asadi because it 
only protects employees who report to the SEC directly. The Second Circuit, in contrast, 
held that Mr. Berman’s internal reporting was sufficient for him to gain protection under 
Dodd–Frank. These conflicting outcomes have created a circuit split with major 
implications for the law of whistleblower protection. This Comment ultimately argues that 
both the text and purpose of Dodd–Frank support the Second Circuit’s conclusion: 
whistleblowers who report suspected violations of law internally, but not to the SEC, are 
protected by Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions.  
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 INTRODUCTION  
Khaled Asadi and Daniel Berman are former employees of companies that 
were subject to various U.S. securities laws.1 Over the course of their employment, 
both men learned of potential violations of the law and dutifully reported this 
information to their superiors.2 Unfortunately, both men lost their jobs (they 
believe) in retaliation for their whistleblowing activities.3 Both subsequently 
brought suit under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act’s (Dodd–Frank) whistleblower protection provisions.4 However, 
because Mr. Asadi and Mr. Berman only reported these violations to their 
supervisors internally, and not to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), their protection under Dodd–Frank was not clear. Ultimately, the Fifth 
 
1 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Asadi 
II] (discussing Mr. Asadi’s concern that certain actions by his employer violated the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act); Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-CV-00523, 2014 WL 6865718 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
15, 2014), adopted in part by 72 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) 
[hereinafter Berman I] (noting that Mr. Berman’s former employer Neo@Ogilvy (Neo) is subject to 
and regulated by U.S. securities laws); see also Nicholas Woodfield, Why the 5th Circ. Was Wrong in 
Asadi v. GE Energy, LAW360 (Feb. 14, 2014, 4:09 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
509472/why-the-5th-circ-was-wrong-in-asadi-v-ge-energy [https://perma.cc/EYY2-6YLK] (noting 
that “Asadi did not include a viable theory of liability until he amended his complaint to include a 
section asserting that FCPA violations are required disclosures under Sarbanes–Oxley”). 
2 See Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 621; Berman I, 2014 WL 6865718, at *3. 
3 See Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 621 (noting that Mr. Asadi was fired after he made internal reports and 
resisted pressure to accept a demotion); Berman I, 2014 WL 6865718, at *3 (“Berman alleges that Neo 
retaliated against him through adverse personnel actions, including the termination of his employment 
on April 30, 2013.”). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). For clarity, this Comment refers to the U.S. Code for the relevant 
provisions of Dodd–Frank rather than to sections of the original Act. 
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Circuit held that Dodd–Frank did not protect Mr. Asadi,5 while the Second 
Circuit held that it did protect Mr. Berman.6 These conflicting outcomes are 
the result of a disagreement between two circuit courts about the statutory 
interpretation of Dodd–Frank, which has major implications for the law of 
whistleblower protection. 
Section 21F of the Exchange Act of 1934,7 as amended by Dodd–Frank, 
provides incentives for individuals to report violations of the securities laws 
to the SEC.8 Dodd–Frank also protects whistleblowers from employer 
retaliation.9 Section 78u-6(a)(6) defines a whistleblower as “any individual who 
provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission.”10 The question presented is whether Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower 
retaliation provisions protect an employee who reports a violation of the 
securities laws internally, but does not report the violation directly to the SEC. 
This Comment first presents the statutory and regulatory background 
necessary to resolve the question presented, including the relevant provisions 
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley),11 Dodd–Frank, and the 
corresponding SEC rulemaking. It then presents the facts, procedural history, 
and reasoning of the circuit opinions in both Mr. Asadi’s case and Mr. Berman’s 
case. Next, this Comment argues that the text and purpose of Dodd–Frank 
support the Second Circuit’s conclusion that whistleblowers who report suspected 
violations of law internally, but not to the SEC, are protected by Dodd–Frank’s 
anti-retaliation provisions. Finally, this Comment speculates on the future of this 
issue, including the prospect of Supreme Court review. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
1. Sarbanes–Oxley 
In 2002, Congress enacted Sarbanes–Oxley to “safeguard investors in public 
companies and restore trust in the financial markets” as a result of “a series of 
 
5 Asadi II, 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013). 
6 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Berman III]. 
7 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21F, 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b) (noting that the SEC will pay an award to people who provide “original 
information” that leads to a successful enforcement action). 
9 See id. § 78u-6(h)(1) (providing specific protections for whistleblowers with respect to 
employer retaliation). 
10 Id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). Section 21F is titled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives 
and Protection.” 
11 Id. § 7241. 
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celebrated accounting debacles”12 at large corporations, including Enron and 
WorldCom.13 Relevant to the cases discussed below, Sarbanes–Oxley includes 
protection for whistleblowers. It provides that “[n]o [public] company . . . may 
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate 
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of 
[whistleblowing or other protected activity].”14 
If companies do take retaliatory action, employees are entitled to relief 
under the statute.15 Individuals who wish to bring claims under Sarbanes–Oxley’s 
anti-retaliatory provisions must first file their complaint with the Secretary of 
Labor.16 If the Secretary has not issued a decision within 180 days, the individual 
may file suit in federal court.17 The statute provides that an “employee 
prevailing in any action under [this section] shall be entitled to all relief necessary 
to make the employee whole,” including reinstatement to his same position in the 
company, back pay with interest, and other “compensation for special damages 
sustained as a result of the discrimination, including litigation costs, expert 
witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees.”18 Finally, individuals must file a claim 
“not later than 180 days after the date on which the violation occurs, or after the 
date on which the employee became aware of the violation.”19 
While scholars initially praised the whistleblower protection provisions in 
Sarbanes–Oxley, some have questioned their effect in practice.20 In fact, one 
study by Richard Moberly found that in the first three years after its passage, 
just 3.6% of employees won during the initial administrative process and only 
 
12 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010); see also 
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015) (“The Sarbanes–Oxley Act, all agree, was prompted 
by the exposure of Enron’s massive accounting fraud and revelations that the company’s outside 
auditor, Arthur Anderson LLP, had systematically destroyed potentially incriminating documents.”); 
Brief of SEC, Amicus Curiae in Support of the Appellant at 6-8, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 
F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4626) [hereinafter Brief of SEC] (exploring the legislative history of 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act). 
13 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1161 (2014). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012). 
15 Id. § 1514A(b)(1). 
16 Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(A). 
17 Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B). 
18 Id. § 1514A(c)(1)–(2). 
19 Id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D). 
20 Compare Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 103 (2005) (“[T]he Sarbanes–Oxley Act creates the first corporate 
whistleblower protection statute that is truly national in scope. Its enactment confirms the importance 
of encouraging whistleblowing by protecting those corporate whistleblowers who expose a broad range 
of misconduct. In doing so, the provision accepts the importance of personal responsibility and 
accountability to the law.”), with Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why 
Sarbanes–Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 91 (2007) (documenting a 
remarkably low win- rate among employees bringing retaliation claims under Sarbanes–Oxley that only 
“decreas[ed] over time”). 
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6.5% won through the administrative appeals process.21 Moberly revisited the 
study ten years after Sarbanes–Oxley’s passage and found that an employee’s 
chances of success had actually worsened with the passage of time.22 From 
the Act’s effective date through 2011, employees won just 1.8% of cases at the 
administrative level.23   
2. Dodd–Frank 
Congress enacted Dodd–Frank in response to the financial crisis in 
2008.24 The Act established incentives to encourage reporting to the SEC: 
Congress instructed the SEC to establish a whistleblower program, authorizing 
the SEC to pay an award to eligible whistleblowers who voluntarily provide the 
Commission with original information about a violation of the federal securities 
laws that leads to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative 
action, or a related action.25 
Relevant here, Dodd–Frank also provides for whistleblower protection. Dodd–
Frank defines a whistleblower as “any individual who provides . . . information 
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner 
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”26 Dodd–Frank includes the 
following protections for individuals who qualify as whistleblowers: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, . . . or in any 
other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions 
of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower— 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this section; 
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial 
or administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such 
information; or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter, . . . and any other law, rule, or 
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.27 
 
21 Moberly, supra note 20, at 67. 
22 See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes–Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. 
L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2012) (noting that the already-low employee win rates reported in the original 
study had only decreased). 
23 Id. at 29. 
24 See Asadi II, 720 F.3d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 2013). 
25 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 
741 (3d ed. 2012); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F–2, 240.21F–8, 240.21F–16 (2013) (outlining the conditions 
under which the SEC will provide awards). Awards under this incentive program can be substantial, 
ranging between ten and thirty percent of the value of the SEC sanction. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5. 
26 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (emphasis added). 
27 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
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The whistleblower provisions of Dodd–Frank and Sarbanes–Oxley differ 
in several important aspects. First, while individuals who wish to bring an 
anti-retaliation claim under Sarbanes–Oxley must first file an administrative 
action with the Secretary of Labor,28 Dodd–Frank allows whistleblowers to 
file immediately in federal court.29 Second, because Dodd–Frank provides for 
the doubling of back pay, monetary damages are potentially greater under 
Dodd–Frank than under Sarbanes–Oxley, which only provides back pay with 
interest.30 Finally, Dodd–Frank’s statute of limitations of at least six years 
dwarfs the 180-day statute of limitations provided by Sarbanes–Oxley.31 
3. SEC Rulemaking 
On August 12, 2011, the SEC promulgated the following rule to 
implement Section 21F of Dodd–Frank: 
(a) Definition of a whistleblower. (1) You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly 
with others, you provide the Commission with information pursuant to the 
procedures set forth in § 240.21F-9(a) of this chapter, and the information 
relates to a possible violation of the Federal securities laws (including any rules 
or regulations thereunder) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. A 
whistleblower must be an individual. A company or another entity is not 
eligible to be a whistleblower. 
(2) To be eligible for an award, you must submit original information to the 
Commission in accordance with the procedures and conditions described in 
§§ 240.21F-4, 240.21F-8, and 240.21F-9 of this chapter. 
 
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
29 Compare id. (“A person who alleges discharge or other discrimination by any person in 
violation of [this section] . . . may seek relief . . . by . . . filing a complaint with the Secretary of 
Labor.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B) (“An individual who alleges discharge or other discrimination 
in violation of [this section] may bring an action under this [section] in the appropriate district court 
of the United States . . . .”); see also Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 629 (explaining the procedural differences 
between Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank); CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 25, at 741 (“Unlike the 
Sarbanes–Oxley whistleblower provision, employees need not exhaust their administrative remedies 
with [the Occupational Safety and Health Administration] before filing suit.”). 
30 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (“Relief for an individual prevailing in an action . . . shall 
include . . . 2 times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the individual, with interest.”), with 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (providing that relief “shall include . . . the amount of back pay, with interest”); 
see also Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 629 (noting the disparity in monetary damages between Sarbanes–Oxley 
and Dodd–Frank). 
31 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (providing a six-year statute of limitations from the date 
of the violation, or a three-year statute of limitations “after the date when facts material to the right of the 
action are known or reasonably should have been known[,]” and an absolute ten-year statute of limitations), 
with 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (imposing a 180-day statute of limitations); see also Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 
629 (discussing the differing statutes of limitations between Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–Frank). 
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(b) Prohibition against retaliation. (1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation 
protections afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 
78u-6(h)(1)), you are a whistleblower if: 
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are providing 
relates to a possible securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a possible 
violation of the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that has occurred, 
is ongoing, or is about to occur, and; 
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in Section 
21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(A)). 
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you satisfy the 
requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award. 
(2) Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)), 
including any rules promulgated thereunder, shall be enforceable in an action 
or proceeding brought by the Commission.32 
The SEC released a statement accompanying the issuance of this rule, which 
made clear that this rule extended Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions to 
protect those individuals who report internally but do not report to the 
Commission. In it, the SEC noted that “the statutory anti-retaliation protections 
[of Dodd–Frank] apply to three different categories of whistleblowers, and the 
third category [described in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)] includes individuals 
who report to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.”33 
B. Facts, Procedural History, and Circuit Opinions 
1. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (5th Cir. 2013) 
Plaintiff, Khaled Asadi, was hired as G.E. Energy’s Iraq Country Executive 
in 2006.34 In 2010, Iraqi officials told Mr. Asadi that G.E. Energy had hired a 
woman with close ties to a certain senior Iraqi official.35 The Iraqi officials were 
worried that G.E. Energy had hired the woman in order to curry favor in an 
upcoming negotiation.36 Mr. Asadi, concerned that this conduct might violate 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),37 reported this information to his 
 
32 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2 (2013) (emphasis added). 
33 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 
76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,304 (June 13, 2011). 
34 Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 621. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.; see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The FCPA “generally prohibits the payment of bribes to 
foreign officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business” and applies “to publicly traded companies and 
their officers, directors, employees, stockholders, and agents” anywhere in the world. Spotlight on Foreign 
482 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 475 
supervisor and to a G.E. Energy ombudsman.38 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Asadi 
received, in his opinion, a “surprisingly negative” performance review.39 Following 
this review, he alleged the company pressured him to accept a demotion, which 
he refused.40 G.E. Energy fired Mr. Asadi approximately one year after his initial 
report.41 He did not report this potential FCPA violation to the SEC.42 
Mr. Asadi brought suit against G.E. Energy, alleging the company violated 
Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower-protection provision by firing him because of his 
internal reporting.43 Relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality,44 the 
court concluded that Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliatory provision did not apply abroad, 
and therefore, dismissed Mr. Asadi’s case with prejudice for failing to state a 
claim.45 Moreover, the court held that “the cited provisions of [Sarbanes–Oxley] 
and the FCPA, as incorporated in the Anti-Retaliation Provision, d[id] not 
provide [Mr. Asadi] with relief for the alleged retaliation against him.”46 
Because the court relied on the presumption against extraterritoriality, it did not 
reach the question of whether Mr. Asadi was protected under Dodd–Frank 
despite failing to report to the SEC.47 Mr. Asadi appealed.48 
A unanimous panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed.49 Disregarding the district 
court’s extraterritoriality theory, the panel instead held that “the plain language 
of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection provisions creates a private cause 
of action only for individuals who provide information relating to a violation of 
 
Corrupt Practices Act, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa.shtml [https://perma.cc/UEA9-JBY2] 
(last updated Oct. 16, 2014).  
38 Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 621. An ombudsman is “one that investigates, reports on, and helps settle 
complaints.” Ombudsman, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ombuds
man [https://perma.cc/GR7B-MVQR]. 
39 Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 621 (internal quotations omitted). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 624. 
43 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., No. 4:12-345, 2012 WL 2522599, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 
2012), aff ’d, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Asadi I]. Mr. Asadi also brought breach of contract 
claims, but since such claims are beyond the scope of this Comment, they will not be discussed further. 
44 Extraterritoriality refers to the “longstanding principle of American law that legislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
Accordingly, “unless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to give a statute 
extraterritorial effect,” courts presume statutes are “primarily concerned with domestic conditions.” Id. 
(quoting Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at 248) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45 Asadi I, 2012 WL 2522599, at *5-6. 
46 Id. at *7. 
47 See Asadi II, 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Having reached this [extraterritoriality] 
conclusion, [the district court] declined to decide whether Asadi qualified as a ‘whistleblower’ under the 
whistleblower-protection provision.”). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 630. 
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the securities laws to the SEC.”50 As Mr. Asadi did not report the potential 
violation to the SEC, the court concluded he had failed to state a claim.51 
The court first emphasized that if the “statutory text is plain and 
unambiguous,” the court “must apply the statute according to its terms.”52 The 
court identified the main textual inquiry before it as the interplay between the 
definitional section and the whistleblower protection section—subsection (a) 
and (h), respectively.53 The term “whistleblower” is specifically defined in 
subsection (a),54 and the court held that “[t]his definition, standing alone, 
expressly and unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to 
the SEC to qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ for purposes of § 78u-6.”55 
The court rejected Mr. Asadi’s argument that subsection (h)’s cross-reference 
to Sarbanes–Oxley protects individuals such as himself who report internally.56 
The court noted that while “[t]he three categories listed in subparagraph 
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A) represent the protected activity in a whistleblower-protection 
claim[,] [t]hey do not . . . define which individuals qualify as whistleblowers.”57 
The court also found the categories in subsection (h) to be unambiguous.58 
Despite recognizing that the “practical result” of its reading of § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) 
meant “that individuals may take protected activity yet still not qualify as a 
whistleblower,” the court did not think this rendered the statute “conflicting or 
superfluous.”59 First, a conflict between the definition of “whistleblower”60 and 
the third category of protected whistleblower activity61 would exist “only if [the 
court] read the three categories of protected activity as additional definitions 
of three types of whistleblowers.”62 Moreover, the court found it “significant” 
that Congress used the defined term “whistleblower” immediately preceding 
 
50 Id. at 623. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 622 (quoting Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 387 (2009)); see also BedRoc Ltd. v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (“The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to 
presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” 
(citation omitted)). 
53 Id. 
54 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
55 Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 622 (emphasis added). 
56 See id. at 624-25 (rejecting Mr. Asadi’s submission that the third category of protected activity 
“does not necessarily require disclosure of information to the SEC”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) 
(cross-referencing Sarbanes–Oxley). 
57 Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 625. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 626. 
60 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a) (2012) (“You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you provide 
the Commission with information [that] . . . relates to a possible violation of the Federal securities laws.”). 
61 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (protecting whistleblowers against employer retaliation for “making 
disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002”). 
62 Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 626. 
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the three categories of protected activity.63 Second, the court emphasized that 
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is not made superfluous by this interpretation because “this 
category protects whistleblowers from retaliation, based not on the individual’s 
disclosure of information to the SEC but, instead, on that individual’s other 
possible required or protected disclosure(s).”64 The court employed a 
hypothetical65 to support this theory, and it concluded that it was actually Mr. 
Asadi’s suggested construction that would render part of the statute superfluous 
because it “would read the words ‘to the Commission’ out of the statute.”66 
The court also noted its concern that Mr. Asadi’s construction would 
render moot Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower protections insofar as 
whistleblower protections would be greater under Dodd–Frank, leaving 
plaintiffs no reason to bring claims under Sarbanes–Oxley’s provisions.67 The 
court noted three differences between Sarbanes–Oxley’s anti-retaliation 
provisions and Dodd–Frank’s provisions to support this proposition: (1) 
Dodd–Frank provides for greater monetary damages, (2) Sarbanes–Oxley 
restricts how plaintiffs may file their claims, and (3) Dodd–Frank provides a 
longer statute of limitations period.68 
Finally, the court rejected Mr. Asadi’s argument that it should defer to the 
SEC’s recent Dodd–Frank whistleblower regulation.69 The court acknowledged 
that the SEC’s regulation did in fact adopt Mr. Asadi’s suggested construction of 
§ 78u-(h), but it maintained that the plain language of the statute does not 
support this reading.70 Rather, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause Congress ha[d] 
directly addressed the precise question at issue,” it was bound to “reject the SEC’s 
expansive interpretation of the term ‘whistleblower’ for purposes of the 
 
63 See id. at 626; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (“No employer may discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower 
in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
64 Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 627 (alteration in original). 
65 The court proposed the following hypothetical: A mid-level manager discovers fraud and 
reports it both internally and to the SEC. His supervisor does not know of the report to the SEC, 
and he fires the mid-level manager. “[E]ven though the CEO was not aware of the report to the 
SEC at the time he terminated the mid-level manager, the mid-level manager can state a claim 
under [Dodd–Frank] because he was a ‘whistleblower’ and suffered retaliation based on his disclosure 
to the CEO, which is protected under [Sarbanes–Oxley].” Id. at 627-28. 
66 Id. at 628 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012)). 
67 See Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 628-29 (reviewing the reasons an individual would be unlikely to raise 
an anti-retaliation claim under Sarbanes–Oxley if the court accepted a construction of “the Dodd–Frank 
whistleblower-protection provision [that] extend[ed] beyond the statutory definition of ‘whistleblowers’”). 
68 See id. at 629. 
69 See id. at 629-30. 
70 See id. 
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whistleblower-protection provision.”71 Moreover, the court found the SEC’s 
regulations defining “whistleblower” to be inconsistent.72 
2. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy (2d Cir. 2015) 
Plaintiff, Daniel Berman, was the finance director at Neo@Ogilvy (Neo), a 
media agency, from October 2010 to April 2013.73 Mr. Berman was responsible 
for Neo’s financial reporting and its compliance with the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).74 
Mr. Berman brought suit against Neo in January 2014, alleging that he was 
wrongfully terminated in violation of Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower protection 
provisions.75 In his complaint, Mr. Berman alleged that he discovered various 
accounting practices that he considered fraudulent and violations of GAAP, 
Sarbanes–Oxley, and Dodd–Frank.76 According to Mr. Berman, he reported 
these alleged violations to his supervisor at Neo.77 In April 2013, he was fired.78 
Mr. Berman claimed that his internal reporting of fraud had angered a senior 
officer at Neo and that he was fired as a result.79 In August 2013, Mr. Berman 
reported his allegations of fraud to the audit committee of Neo’s parent 
company.80 In October 2013, nearly six months after Mr. Berman was terminated, 
he reported the alleged accounting violations to the SEC.81 
Neo filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Berman’s complaint.82 Relying on several 
earlier decisions from the Southern District of New York and the 2011 SEC rule 
promulgated to clarify the definition of whistleblower under Dodd–Frank, the 
magistrate court concluded that Mr. Berman qualified as a whistleblower under 
Dodd–Frank.83 However, for other reasons, the magistrate court ultimately 
 
71 Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) for the proposition 
that “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). 
72 See id. at 630. 
73 Berman III, 801 F.3d 145, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2015). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 149. Mr. Berman also brought breach of contract claims related to his employment 
contract with Neo. Id. These claims are beyond the scope of this Comment and therefore will not 
be addressed further. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See id. (describing Mr. Berman’s report to the audit committee of WPP Group USA, Inc.). 
81 Id. 
82 Berman I, No. 14-00523, 2014 WL 6865718, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2014). 
83 See id. at *6-*8. 
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recommended that Mr. Berman’s claims be dismissed without prejudice for 
failure to state a claim.84 
The district court rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation with 
respect to Mr. Berman’s anti-retaliation claims.85 The court, relying instead on 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asadi,86 held that “the language of the statute 
unambiguously requires that a person provide information to the Commission in 
order to qualify as a whistleblower under the Act.”87 Because Mr. Berman had 
only reported violations internally before his termination, he did not have a 
remedy under Dodd–Frank.88 
Mr. Berman appealed, and a divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed.89 
The panel concluded that “the pertinent provisions of Dodd–Frank create[d] a 
sufficient ambiguity to warrant [the court’s] deference to the SEC’s interpretive 
rule, which support[ed] Berman’s view of the statute.”90 Discussing the relevant 
text of Dodd–Frank, the court noted that “there is no absolute conflict between 
the Commission notification requirement in the definition of ‘whistleblower’ 
and the absence of such a requirement in both subdivision (iii) of subsection 
[78u-6(h)(1)(A)] of Dodd–Frank and the Sarbanes–Oxley provisions incorporated 
by subdivision (iii).”91 Despite no outright conflict,92 however, the court 
recognized that “a significant tension within subsection [78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)] 
nevertheless remain[ed],” as applying such a reading “would leave that 
subdivision with an extremely limited scope.”93 Other than the “rare example of 
simultaneous . . . reporting to an employer and to the Commission, there would 
 
84 See id. at *14. With respect to the anti-retaliation claim, the court found that Mr. Berman 
failed to plead facts establishing “both that he subjectively and objectively held a reasonable belief 
that the reported conduct violated Sarbanes–Oxley or federal securities laws and that ‘a law or rule in 
the SEC’s jurisdiction explicitly requires or protects disclosure of that violation.’” Id. at *10 (quoting 
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., 2011 WL 162066, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011)). As “Dodd–Frank does 
not protect whistleblowers who report violations of any laws or regulations subject to the SEC’s 
jurisdiction,” id. at *9 (quoting Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *6) (emphasis added), the court 
recommended dismissing Mr. Berman’s claim with leave to amend. Id. at *12. With respect to the 
breach of contract claims, the court found fatal Neo’s “disclaimer, which explicitly preserve[d] the right 
to terminate an employee without cause or notice.” Id. at *14. 
85 Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d, 801 F.3d 145 
(2d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Berman II]. 
86 Asadi II, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013). 
87 Berman II, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 405 (emphasis added). 
88 See id. at 410-11 (granting Neo’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim). 
89 Berman III, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015). 
90 Id. at 146. 
91 Id. at 150. 
92 See id. at 150-51 (providing, as an example of a situation in which “an absolute contradiction” is 
avoided, a scenario where an employee simultaneously reports suspected wrongdoing to his supervisor 
and the SEC); see also Asadi II, 720 F.3d 620, 627-28 (5th Cir. 2013) (relaying a similar example involving 
a mid-level manager who reports a violation of securities laws to both his company’s CEO and the SEC). 
93 Berman III, 801 F.3d at 151. 
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be virtually no situation where an SEC reporting requirement would leave 
subdivision (iii) with any scope.”94 
Finding it difficult to believe that Congress wished subsection (iii) to have 
such a limited effect, the court turned to the legislative history—an inquiry it 
ultimately found “yield[ed] nothing,” as the legislative history shed no light on 
the inclusion of subsection (iii).95 The court acknowledged that its conclusion was 
at odds with the Fifth Circuit’s finding in Asadi that the “statutory text [was] 
plain and unambiguous,”96 but it noted that a large number of district courts had 
found the statute ambiguous and, as a result, accorded the SEC interpretation 
Chevron deference.97 “Thus,” the court expounded, “although our decision creates 
a circuit split, it does so against a landscape of existing disagreement among a 
large number of district courts.”98 
The court noted that while both appellant and appellee accused each other of 
creating superfluous language, “these arguments ignore[d] the realities of the 
legislative process.”99 “[I]t is not at all surprising,” the court remarked, “that no 
one noticed that the new subdivision and the definition of ‘whistleblower’ do not 
fit together neatly.”100 Ultimately, the Second Circuit majority believed the 
statutory text left “the matter unclear.”101 The court concluded that it  
need not definitively construe the statute, because, at a minimum, the tension 
between the definition in subsection [78u-6(a)(6)] and the limited protection 
provided by subdivision (iii) of subsection [78u-6(h)(1)(A)] if it is subject to that 
definition renders section [78u-6] as a whole sufficiently ambiguous to oblige [the 
court] to give Chevron deference to the reasonable interpretation of the agency 
charged with administering the statute.102 
 
94 Id. at 152. 
95 Id. The court likened the origins of subsection (iii) to those of the Alien Tort Act, which 
Judge Friendly “felicitous[ly] characterize[ed] as ‘a kind of legal Lohengrin; . . . no one seems to 
know whence it came.’” Id. at 153 (quoting IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975), 
abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010)). 
96 Asadi II, 720 F.3d at 622. 
97 Courts defer to an agency’s reasonable exercise of discretion in interpreting statutes that are 
“silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue at hand.” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984). “A statute is considered ambiguous if it can be read more than one way.” AFL-CIO 
v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
98 Berman III, 801 F.3d at 153. 
99 Id. at 154; see also id. (comparing Berman’s contention that subjecting subsection (iii) to a 
Commission reporting requirement “would be superfluous because the Sarbanes–Oxley protections 
purportedly incorporated would have no effect,” with Neo and the SEC’s argument that applying 
the whistleblower definition to all three subsections would render the Commission reporting 
requirement superfluous). 
100 Id. This observation is particularly germane considering the hasty addition of subsection 
(iii). See id. (referring to subsection (iii) as a “last-minute insertion”). 
101 Id. at 155. 
102 Id. 
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Judge Jacobs dissented. He argued that the panel majority and the SEC 
through its rulemaking had simply deleted the words “to the Commission” 
from the statute.103 Judge Jacobs noted that the definition of “whistleblower” 
in 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) was unambiguous and that statutory definitions, in 
particular, are “one of the ‘prominent manner[s]’ for limiting the meaning of 
statutory text.”104 According to Judge Jacobs, the majority “assume[d] its own 
conclusion” by arguing that § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) protects employees.105 Judge 
Jacobs did not believe his interpretation created any problems because plaintiffs 
could still rely on protection under Sarbanes–Oxley. He explained that while 
“[a] shorter statute of limitations [under Sarbanes–Oxley] may be inconvenient 
for some plaintiffs . . . it does not threaten the entire statutory scheme.”106 On 
the contrary, “[t]he only palpable danger lurking here is that bureaucrats and 
federal judges assume and exercise power to redraft a statute to give it a more 
respectable reach.”107  
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S POSITION IS CORRECT 
The Second Circuit was correct to conclude that Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower 
protection provisions protect an employee who reports a suspected violation 
to his supervisors but who does not report the violation to the SEC. As a 
result of sloppy drafting, the statute is ambiguous such that a court’s inquiry 
should not end with the text. Instead, as the agency charged with 
administering and enforcing federal securities laws, the SEC is properly owed 
Chevron deference.108 The SEC’s 2011 rule and accompanying guidance make 
clear that Dodd–Frank protects all employees who engage in whistleblower 
activity, even if they do not report directly to the Commission. This outcome 
is consistent with a fair reading of the text of the statute. It is also consistent 
with an important purpose of Dodd–Frank, as the statute aims not only to 
create incentives for individuals to blow the whistle but also to encourage 
individuals, where appropriate, to report potential violations internally first. 
Future circuit courts should follow the well-reasoned decision of the Second 
Circuit in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy. 
 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 156 (alteration in original) (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015)). 
105 See id. at 157 (“Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower-protection provisions do not mention this 
(generic) employee.”). 
106 Id. at 159. 
107 Id. 
108 See supra note 97. 
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A. The Plain Meaning of Dodd–Frank’s Text 
While it may appear to be an easy solution to an otherwise difficult analysis 
of statutory interpretation, a court should not simply stop at the definition of 
“whistleblower.” This would be shortsighted analysis. Instead, the definition of 
whistleblower under Dodd–Frank must be understood within its entire 
statutory and regulatory context.109 
Dodd–Frank defines “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides . . . 
information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”110 
The statute also provides protection for such individuals: “No employer may 
discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any 
other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and conditions 
of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower . . . .”111 In 
Asadi, the Fifth Circuit stopped here and concluded that because the definition 
of “whistleblower” requires that an individual report to the SEC, and because 
this defined term is used in the anti-retaliation provision, the statute only 
protects someone who reports to the SEC.112 At first glance, this may appear 
to be a fair reading of the text. However, the language that follows this general 
prohibition against employer retaliation casts doubt on this interpretation. 
Immediately following the language quoted above, the statute provides 
three categories that further refine the phrase “any lawful act done by the 
whistleblower.”113 The first category states simply that a whistleblower is 
protected “in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this 
section.”114 Notably, Congress again utilized the phrase “to the Commission.” 
The second category explains that whistleblowers are protected if they 
participate in any investigation with the SEC related to the information they 
provide.115 Like the first category, the focus of this category is on the 
whistleblower’s interaction with the SEC. 
 
109 See, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental 
canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a 
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the 
question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory 
provision in isolation. The meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become 
evident when placed in context.”). 
110 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
111 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
112 See supra text accompanying note 50. 
113 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). 
114 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i). 
115 See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(ii) (noting specifically that a whistleblower’s “lawful act” includes 
“initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action of the 
Commission based upon or related to such information”). 
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However, it is the third category that provides the most difficult hurdle 
for the straightforward textualist approach espoused by the Fifth Circuit in 
Asadi. The third category protects whistleblowers “in making disclosures that 
are required or protected under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act . . . and any other law, 
rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”116 This final 
category is very broad, and unlike the first two categories, it neither emphasizes 
disclosure to the Commission nor contemplates participation in an ongoing 
investigation with the Commission. The only mention of “the Commission” 
in this category is with respect to “regulation[s]” from the SEC, which would 
only expand the category of protection. It is undisputed that employees, like 
Mr. Asadi and Mr. Berman, who report suspected violations of law to their 
supervisors, are protected under Sarbanes–Oxley.117 
The Fifth Circuit’s textualist reading creates many problems. First, if the 
Fifth Circuit’s reading is correct, it is hard to understand what if anything was 
accomplished when Congress added this third category. The Fifth Circuit tried 
to resolve this problem with the tortured hypothetical alluded to above:118 
Assume a mid-level manager discovers a securities law violation. On the day he makes 
this discovery, he immediately reports [it] (1) to his company’s [CEO] and (2) to the 
SEC. Unfortunately for the mid-level manager, the CEO, who is not yet aware of the 
disclosure to the SEC, immediately fires the mid-level manager. The mid-level 
manager, clearly a “whistleblower” as defined in Dodd–Frank because he provided 
information to the SEC relating to a securities law violation, would be unable to prove 
that he was retaliated against because of the report to the SEC. Accordingly, the first 
and second category of protected activity would not shield this whistleblower from 
retaliation. The third category of protected activity, however, protects the mid-level 
manager. In this scenario, the internal disclosure to the CEO . . . is protected under 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A, the anti-retaliation provision enacted as part of the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002 . . . . Accordingly, even though the CEO was not aware of the report to 
the SEC at the time he terminated the mid-level manager, the mid-level manager can 
state a claim under the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection provision because he 
was a “whistleblower” and suffered retaliation based on his disclosure to the CEO, 
which was protected under [Sarbanes–Oxley].119 
 
116 Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 
117 See Berman III, 801 F.3d 145, 156 (2d Cir. 2015) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“The plaintiff in this 
case reported the violation to his employer, and did not report it ‘to the [Securities and Exchange] 
Commission,’ and he is therefore protected from retaliation under Sarbanes–Oxley only.” (citations 
omitted)); see also Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 4, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(No. 14-4626), 2015 WL 3533004 [hereinafter Chamber of Commerce Brief] (“[T]he parties agree [that] 
there is no requirement that a claimant have made a report to the SEC [under Sarbanes–Oxley].”). 
118 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
119 Asadi II, 720 F.3d 620, 627–628 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
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According to the Fifth Circuit, the third category would apply in the rare 
situation where an employee simultaneously reports a suspected violation of 
law to both his employer and to the SEC, and he is fired instantly, such that 
his employer has no time to learn of the report to the SEC prior to 
termination. As the Second Circuit acknowledged, this is a highly 
questionable outcome that “would leave [category three] with an extremely 
limited scope.”120 Such an outcome also “raises an immediate question”121: why 
would Congress not have been more specific and direct if it had truly 
intended to protect such a small category of individuals?122 
Moreover, it is not even clear that this hypothetical provides any scope to 
category three. First, it is far from certain that the whistleblower who 
simultaneously reports to his employer and to the SEC could rely on category 
three to pursue a private action against his employer. As the SEC pointed 
out in its amicus brief to the Second Circuit, “if an employer is genuinely 
unaware that the employee has separately disclosed to the Commission, any 
adverse employment action that the employer takes would appear to lack the 
requisite retaliatory intent—i.e., the intent to punish the employee for 
engaging in protected activity.”123 
This reading also creates a structural problem within the statute. 
Subparagraph (A) of § 78u-6(h)(1) “principally operates as a prohibition 
directed to employers [and] seeks to prevent retaliation by placing employers on 
notice that they may not take adverse employment action against employees 
who engage in certain whistleblowing activity.”124 However, under the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation, category three would be ineffective as a preventive 
measure. Since “employers would not know that a report was made to the 
Commission, [category three] would have no appreciable effect in deterring 
employers from taking adverse employment action for internal reports.”125 
Therefore, “apart from the rare example of simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous) 
reporting of wrongdoing to an employer and to the Commission, there would 
 
120 Berman III, 801 F.3d at 155. 
121 Brief of SEC, supra note 12, at 21. 
122 Id. (“If Congress had actually intended to protect only those ‘required or protected’ disclosures 
that satisfy these two conditions, why would Congress craft clause (iii) to unnecessarily suggest that it 
protects a much broader class of disclosures than it actually does? Surely Congress could have been 
more explicit and more direct if it in fact intended to protect only those disclosures that involve 
securities law violations, and only if the employee has made a separate disclosure to the Commission.”). 
123 Id. at 23; cf. Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 844 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Under the 
first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation by showing . . . the defendant’s knowledge of the protected activity . . . [and] ‘a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.’” (quoting Jute v. 
Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005))). 
124 Brief of SEC, supra note 12, at 22-23. 
125 Id. 
492 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 475 
be virtually no situation where an SEC reporting requirement would leave 
[category three] with any scope.”126 
The Fifth Circuit also justified its reading by arguing that Mr. Asadi’s 
interpretation rendered the words “to the Commission” in the definition 
of whistleblower superfluous, but that its reading did not.127 This is 
incorrect. The Fifth Circuit’s reading also renders the statute superfluous 
because § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i) includes the phrase “to the Commission.” In other 
words, the Fifth Circuit reads the statute in the following manner: “No 
employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or 
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the 
terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by [an 
individual who provides information relating to a violation of the Securities laws 
to the Commission] . . . in providing information to the Commission in accordance 
with this section.”128 The fact “[t]hat either of two competing interpretations 
yields superfluous statutory language confirms that Congress did not speak 
unambiguously on the issue.”129 Thus, because there is no clear and unambiguous 
interpretation of the statute, the SEC’s rule is owed Chevron deference.130 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s interpretation is consistent with a fair reading 
of the statute, while the Fifth Circuit’s reading leaves category three superfluous 
and without any scope. One cannot simply stop at the definition of 
“whistleblower”; instead, this definition must be understood in context. In any 
event, as both interpretations arguably yield statutory superfluity, the text is by 
definition ambiguous such that the SEC is properly owed Chevron deference. 
B. The Purpose of Dodd–Frank 
The Fifth Circuit’s position also runs afoul of the purpose of Dodd–Frank’s 
whistleblower protection provisions. In Dodd–Frank, Congress tasked the 
SEC with creating rules to incentivize whistleblowing.131 The SEC responded 
 
126 Berman III, 801 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). 
127 Asadi II, 720 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 2013) (“While it is correct that [under our reading] 
individuals may take protected activity yet still not qualify as a whistleblower, that practical result 
does not render § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) conflicting or superfluous.”). 
128 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). 
129 Brief of SEC, supra note 12, at 27; see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 
2248 (2011) (“[T]he canon against superfluity assists only where a competing interpretation gives 
effect ‘to every clause and word of a statute.’” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). 
130 See supra note 97. 
131 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (“[T]he Commission, under regulations prescribed by the 
Commission and subject to subsection (c), shall pay an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers 
who voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful 
enforcement of the covered judicial or administrative action, or related action . . . .”); id. § 78u-6(j) 
(“The Commission shall have the authority to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
or appropriate to implement the provisions of this section consistent with the purposes of this 
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by creating what is now commonly referred to as the whistleblower “bounty” 
program.132 During the notice-and-comment process, “[m]any commenters[,] 
. . . particularly industry-affiliated commenters, urged the Commission to 
encourage or require individuals to report internally before reporting to the 
Commission.”133 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber) was among 
those who argued for such rules. In its comments, the Chamber urged that “[i]n 
the absence of an affirmative restriction on external reporting when effective 
internal compliance channels are available, or provision of significant incentive for 
using those internal channels, employees will face an irresistible temptation to go 
to the SEC with their report.”134 
The SEC agreed with many of the commenters and concluded that it did 
not want this whistleblower program to “undermine the willingness of 
individuals to make whistleblower reports internally at their companies before 
they make reports to the Commission.”135 The SEC stated that ensuring 
“employees and others were not dissuaded from reporting internally due to the 
possibility of a monetary award” was a “principal challenge” in creating the 
whistleblower award program under Dodd–Frank.136 In fact, the SEC noted 
that “the subject company may at times be better able to distinguish between 
meritorious and frivolous claims.”137 Additionally, the SEC did not want to 
undermine companies’ existing compliance programs.138 Therefore, the final 
rules issued by the Commission “were carefully calibrated to achieve this 
objective by providing ‘strong incentives’ for individuals in appropriate 
 
section.”); see also CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 25, at 741 (discussing Congress’s instruction to 
the SEC to establish a program that included the payment of monetary awards to individuals who 
furnish information leading to successful enforcement of the federal securities laws). 
132 See, e.g., Catherine Foti, SEC, The Whistleblowers’ “Advocate,” FORBES (June 18, 2015, 10:14 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/06/18/sec-the-whistleblowers-advocate/#198f721e129d 
[https://perma.cc/429J-ZK6Q] (referring to the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive structure as a 
“bounty program” that has “award[ed] payments totaling over $50 million to whistleblowers”). See 
generally David Cooper, Comment, Blowing the Whistle on Consumer Financial Abuse, 163 U. PA. L. 
REV. 557 (2015) (comparing the impact of the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing protection provisions at 
the SEC, which provide for bounty payments to eligible informants, to the impact of those 
provisions at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which include no such bounty payments). 
133 Brief of SEC, supra note 12, at 11 n.13. 
134 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64545, 
76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,326 n.231 (June 13, 2011). 
135 Brief of SEC, supra note 12, at 3. 
136 Id. at 10. 
137 Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
138 Id. at 10 (recognizing the potential for reduced “effectiveness of a company’s existing 
compliance, legal, audit and similar internal processes” in light of possible monetary awards (quoting 
Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 70,488 (Nov. 17, 2010))). 
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circumstances to report internally in the first instance.”139 The SEC noted 
that “internal reporting processes can help companies to promptly identify, 
correct, and self-report unlawful conduct by officers, employees, or others 
connected to the company.”140 Thus, reporting “through internal compliance 
procedures can complement or otherwise appreciably enhance” the SEC’s 
enforcement efforts.141 
Surprisingly, the Chamber appears to have reversed its position since it 
submitted comments during the SEC rulemaking process. In its amicus brief 
to the Second Circuit, the Chamber endorsed the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the statute.142 Despite agreeing with the SEC that the “internal reporting of 
potential securities violations should be encouraged,” the Chamber argued that 
this was “not Congress’s purpose in enacting Dodd–Frank’s whistleblower 
provision” and therefore ultimately agreed with the Fifth Circuit.143 The 
Chamber seems to have taken a position that is expedient in the short-term 
insofar as such an interpretation could potentially reduce whistleblower 
litigation,144 at the cost of important long-term goals, such as maintaining 
effective compliance programs that encourage internal reporting before 
reporting to the SEC in appropriate circumstances. This position is 
shortsighted and misguided, for the same reasons previously asserted.145 
The Fifth Circuit’s position also ignores categories of whistleblowers who 
are statutorily required to first report internally, including lawyers and 
auditors.146 Sarbanes–Oxley requires lawyers to report suspected violations 
“to the chief legal counsel or chief executive officer” of a public company.147 
“[I]f the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence[,]” 
the attorney is “requir[ed] . . . to report the evidence to the audit committee 
of the board of directors” or other appropriate board.148 Moreover, the SEC’s 
Standards of Professional Conduct, which govern the behavior of lawyers 
 
139 Id. at 3 (quoting Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300–01, 34,322 (June 13, 2011)). 
140 Id. at 4-5. 
141 Id. at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
142 See Chamber of Commerce Brief, supra note 117, at 4 (asserting that the Fifth Circuit “properly 
dismissed the Dodd–Frank whistleblower retaliation claim in [Asadi II]” because an employee can only 
receive whistleblower protection if he or she files a complaint with the SEC). 
143 Id. at 18. 
144 An SEC reporting requirement would automatically eliminate from the category of litigants 
entitled to relief under the Dodd–Frank whistleblower-protection provisions any whistleblower who 
did not report the potential violation to the Commission. 
145 As noted above, this reading would afford subsection (iii) an inexplicably narrow scope, introduce 
structural problems within the statute itself, and yield statutory superfluity. See supra Section II.A. 
146 See Berman III, 801 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that there are types of whistleblowers 
who cannot first report suspected violations to the SEC). 
147 15 U.S.C. § 7245(1) (2012). 
148 Id. § 7245(2). 
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practicing before the Commission, assume a lawyer will first report the 
violation of law internally and only report to the SEC if necessary.149 If the 
Fifth Circuit is correct that category three requires reporting to the SEC, 
then lawyers—who in many cases must report internally—are vulnerable to 
retaliation with no remedy under Dodd–Frank. 
Sarbanes–Oxley also requires auditors under certain circumstances to 
“inform the appropriate level of the management . . . [of] illegal acts that have 
been detected . . . in the course of the audit.”150 Moreover, an auditor is required 
to “directly report its conclusions to the board of directors” if, inter alia, senior 
management has not taken “timely and appropriate remedial actions.”151 An 
auditor is permitted to report the violation to the SEC only if the board of 
directors or management does not take appropriate remedial action.152 
Accordingly, “if [category three] requires reporting to the Commission, its express 
cross-reference to the provisions of Sarbanes–Oxley would afford an auditor 
almost no Dodd–Frank protection for retaliation because the auditor must await 
a company response to internal reporting before reporting to the Commission, 
and any retaliation would almost always precede Commission reporting.”153 
Lawyers and auditors represent a huge portion of the universe of potential 
whistleblowers.154 It would be utterly illogical for Congress to require these 
large groups of potential whistleblowers to report under Sarbanes–Oxley but 
then carve them out of the protections offered by Dodd–Frank. It is far more 
likely that Congress intended category three to be read broadly to protect 
categories of likely whistleblowers, like lawyers and auditors. 
Moreover, under the Fifth Circuit’s unreasonably strict reading, an individual 
who first reports a suspected securities law violation to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), or a self-regulatory 
 
149 See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2011) (“If an attorney . . . becomes aware of evidence of a material 
violation by the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer, . . . the attorney shall 
report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer . . . or to both the issuer’s chief legal officer and 
its chief executive officer . . . forthwith.”); id. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii) (permitting an “attorney appearing and 
practicing before the Commission in the representation of an issuer [to] reveal to the Commission, 
without the issuer’s consent, confidential information related to the representation,” including making 
disclosures “[t]o rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused . . . substantial 
injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors”); see also Berman III, 801 F.3d at 
152 (reiterating SEC guidelines for attorneys who contemplate reporting suspected violations). 
150 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b)(1)(B). 
151 Id. § 78j-1(b)(2). 
152 Id. § 78j-1(b)(2)(B). 
153 Berman III, 801 F.3d at 151. 
154 See Richard W. Painter, Lawyers’ Rules, Auditors’ Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 1399, 1405 (2000) (discussing lawyers’ responsibility upon discovering “an 
organization client is about to commit, or is already committing, a crime or fraud”); see also id. at 
1411 (noting that it is incumbent upon auditors “to disclose illegal acts of their clients, including 
violations of securities disclosure laws”). 
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organization like the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in lieu 
of reporting “to the Commission” is not protected under Dodd–Frank.155 This 
is an absurd result and should be avoided.156 As the SEC asserted in its Second 
Circuit amicus brief, “[t]here is no basis to believe that Congress would have 
intended this disparate treatment based purely on the happenstance of which 
agency the individual reported to first given the dual responsibility that the 
Commission and DOJ have for the enforcement of the securities laws.”157 
The Fifth Circuit also wrongly concluded, after citing three distinctions 
between Dodd–Frank and Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower provisions, that 
under Mr. Asadi’s interpretation no whistleblower would ever have reason to sue 
under Sarbanes–Oxley, rendering its remedy provisions moot.158 This is simply 
not true. In its amicus brief to the Second Circuit, the SEC provided two 
reasons that a whistleblower might still prefer an action under Sarbanes–Oxley 
to an action under Dodd–Frank. First, individuals wishing to “avoid the burdens 
of pursuing the claim in court, including potential high litigation costs that they 
might bear if they do not prevail” may find Sarbanes–Oxley’s administrative 
forum within the Department of Labor (DOL) very attractive.159 DOL 
“assumes responsibility for investigating the retaliation claim and preparing the 
evidence for an administrative law judge’s review,”160 substantially reducing an 
individual’s burden. 
Second, it is not always the case that a successful suit under Dodd–Frank will 
offer greater damages than it would under Sarbanes–Oxley. Unlike Dodd–Frank, 
§ 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley “provides for ‘all relief necessary to make the employee 
whole’ and for ‘compensation for any special damages.’”161 As the SEC noted, 
“[t]his language has been held to authorize compensation for emotional 
distress and reputational harm [such that] . . . individuals who have experienced 
 
155 Brief of SEC, supra note 12, at 31. 
156 See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“[I]nterpretations of a statute 
which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with 
the legislative purpose are available.”); see also United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) 
(noting that an interpretation of a statute designed to allocate credit at sentencing to defendants for 
time spent in custody that “would make the award of credit arbitrary [is] a result not to be presumed 
lightly”); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1819) (“But if, in any case, the 
plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to 
be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it 
must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so 
monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.”). 
157 Brief of SEC, supra note 12, 34-35. 
158 Asadi II, 720 F.3d 620, 628 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Asadi’s construction of the whistleblower-
protection provision is problematic for another reason. Specifically, construing the Dodd–Frank 
whistleblower-protection provision to extend beyond the statutory definition of ‘whistleblowers’ 
renders the [Sarbanes–Oxley] anti-retaliation provision, for practical purposes, moot.”). 
159 Brief of SEC, supra note 12, at 26. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1), (c)(2)(C)). 
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minimal pay loss, but significant emotional injuries, may find [Sarbanes–Oxley] 
actions more attractive.”162 Sarbanes–Oxley’s whistleblower provisions are not 
entirely displaced by Dodd–Frank and are therefore not rendered moot by the 
Second Circuit’s decision. 
The Second Circuit’s reading of the whistleblower protection provisions is 
far more consistent with the purpose of Dodd–Frank to incentivize whistleblowing 
than is the reading endorsed by the Fifth Circuit. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit all 
but ignores this purpose, as its position effectively disincentivizes internal 
reporting. This is diametrically opposed to the intentions and interests of 
Congress, the SEC, and various stakeholders. Put simply, the Fifth Circuit’s 
reading produces bad law and bad policy. Future circuit courts should follow the 
Second Circuit’s well-reasoned decision in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy. 
CONCLUSION 
On September 30, 2015, Neo filed a motion to stay the Second Circuit’s 
mandate pending its filing and the disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari 
from the Supreme Court of the United States.163 The Second Circuit granted 
Neo’s motion and issued a stay on October 14, 2015.164 Surprisingly, Neo 
reconsidered its decision. On November 10, 2015, the company filed a letter with 
the Second Circuit informing the court that it no longer planned to file a petition 
for certiorari.165 This was a curious turn of events for Neo, as there was a reasonable 
chance for Supreme Court review.166 It is likely that Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy would 
have piqued the Court’s interest because it created a clear circuit split,167 the 
 
162 Id.; see also Jones v. Southpeak Interactive Corp., 777 F.3d 658, 672 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(concluding that damages for emotional distress are available under section 806 of Sarbanes–Oxley); 
Halliburton, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., 771 F.3d 254, 266 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“In light of 
[Sarbanes–Oxley]’s plain text and the foregoing considerations, we find that the statute affords 
noneconomic compensatory damages, including emotional distress and reputational harm.”). 
163 See Defendant-Appellees’ Motion to Stay Issuance of the Mandate Pending the Filing and 
Disposition of a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626 (2d Cir. 
Sept. 30, 2015), ECF No. 96. 
164 See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626 (2d Cir. Oct. 14, 2015) (order granting stay 
of mandate pending timely filing of petition for writ of certiorari and disposition of petition). 
165 Letter on Behalf of Defendants-Appellees, Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 14-4626 (2d 
Cir. Nov. 10, 2015), ECF No. 99. 
166 When evaluating a certiorari petition, the Supreme Court focuses primarily on four 
factors: (1) the existence of a circuit split, (2) the importance of the issue, (3) the merits of the case, 
and (4) whether specific aspects of the case in question prevent the issue from being squarely 
presented to the Court (also known as “vehicle” issues). See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10 (outlining the 
Court’s “[c]onsiderations [g]overning [r]eview on [c]ertiorari”); see also Timothy S. Bishop et al., 
Tips on Petitioning for and Opposing Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, 34 LITIG. MAG., Winter 2008, 
at 26, 27 (classifying these considerations into four similar categories). 
167 A genuine circuit split exists when one can say with certainty that had this case arisen in 
another circuit, a panel of the other circuit would be bound by its own precedent to reach the opposite 
conclusion in the case. Here, had Mr. Berman’s case arisen in the Fifth Circuit, a panel of the Fifth 
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underlying issue is very important, and the case lacked any vehicle issues. 
Unfortunately, because Neo has forfeited its right to file a petition for certiorari, 
this circuit split will remain unresolved until another case presents the issue. 
 
Circuit would have been bound by its Asadi decision to rule in favor of Neo@Ogilvy. Thus, a genuine 
circuit split exists here, as recognized by the Second Circuit. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.   
